Patterns of childbearing in Russia 1994 - 1998 by Annette Kohlmann & Sergej M. Zuev
Max-Planck-Institut für demografische Forschung
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research
Doberaner Strasse 114 · D-18057 Rostock · GERMANY
Tel +49 (0) 3 81 20 81 - 0; Fax +49 (0) 3 81 20 81 - 202; 
http://www.demogr.mpg.de
MPIDR WORKING PAPER WP 2001-018
JULY 2001




This working paper has been approved for release by: Jan M. Hoem (hoem@demogr.mpg.de)
Head of the Laboratory of Contemporary European Fertility and Family Dynamics.
© Copyright is held by the authors.
Working papers of the Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research receive only limited review. Views or
opinions expressed in working papers are attributable to the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Institute.Patterns of childbearing in Russia 1994 - 1998
by
Annette Kohlmann and Sergey Zuev
1
Abstract
In this paper we analyze the determinants of births in Russia in the 1990s and the
changes in their effects since the 1980s and factors influencing fertility intentions in
the 1990s. In the first part, based on the current social and economic situation in
Russia, specific hypotheses for different parities (realized and intended fertility) are
developed and subsequently tested by using logistic regression methods. On the basis
of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey (RLMS) we find that the social
differentiation that took place in Russia in the 1990s resulted in an increasing
importance of economic conditions for a first, second or third birth. The same applies
to parity-specific intentions.
                                                
1  The views expressed in this paper are the author’s views and do not necessarily reflect those of the
Max Planck Institute for Demographic Research.
We are greatly indebted to Jan M. Hoem and Sergey Zakharov for many helpful comments,
suggestions and discussions.2
1. Introduction
Russia - like all Eastern Europe countries – has experienced tremendous
political, social and demographic changes during the past decade. While the political
and social changes were connected to the breakdown of the Soviet system in one way
or another, demographic changes could be observed long before the period of change
started at the end of the 1980s. Since the post-war period, there had been a slow
decrease in Russian fertility: The total period fertility in Russia in 1950 was clearly
above the natural reproduction level at 2.79, it then dropped to 2.52 in 1960, to 1.99 in
1970 and to 1.89 in 1980. In the 1980s, a temporary increase in the TFR took place
(up to 2.05 in 1985) followed by a brief stabilization period (1990: 1.89). A strong
drop then followed and resulted in a TFR of 1.34 in 1995 (Zakharov 1999:298) and
1.23 in 1997 (Kharkova/Andreev 2000: 212). The tremendous decline in fertility,
especially between 1990 and 1995 (a 29% decline over 5 years or a 34.6% decline in
the period between 1985 and 1995), led Russian demographers to call it a ‘population
crisis’ or even a ‘demographic catastrophe’ (Zakharov 1999:293). Such language was
not only a result of the decline in the TFR, but was also based on the fact that in
1991/92 the net reproduction rate in Russia fell below 1 (and has remained below this
level up to now). The Russian population has a continuously negative natural growth
rate like most of the Western European populations.
Analyses by Kharkova & Andreev based on the Russian Microcensus of 1994
revealed that the sharp decrease is especially a result of a drop in second births (50%)
and, to a smaller extent, also a drop in third births (27%; Kharkova/Andreev 2000:
212). This reduction appears to be an effect of an intended restriction in family size
since the mean age at first birth is low compared to other European countries
(1993/1994: 22.4 years, Zakharov 1999: 306). In fact, the mean age for all birth orders
decreased between 1979 and 1993/1994 except for a brief increase in 1986/1987,
(Zakharov & Ivanova 1996: 49, 73) which is contrary to the trend in most Western
countries. Therefore, one can assume that at least some sort of deliberate disruption of
the childbearing process by women in their reproductive ages took place in the
beginning of the 1990s, and this can not be interpreted as only a postponement effect.3
The fertility decline can be explained by several competing, but not mutually
exclusive arguments
2. While the economic crisis at the beginning of the 1990s is
assumed to have at least a postponing, if not reducing effect on fertility. Another
explanation of the fertility development is to see it as an adjustment process in which
Eastern European demographic behavior converges on the pattern observed in
Western Europe. Similar to the latter approach, theorists of the second demographic
transition assume that the adjustment relates not only to demographic behavior, but
especially to non-economic aspects like values and attitudes. According to this
argument, the decrease in fertility is a result of a modernization and secularization
process that leads to individualized, and therefore less child-centered, attitudes and
reduces fertility behavior. While the first mentioned approach sees fertility
development in Russia during the past decade rather as a ‘catastrophe’, the latter two
see it rather as a ‘normalization’ process.
A further Russia-specific argumentation results from an exclusively
demographic phenomenon: In the beginning of the 1980s, pronatalist policy measures
were introduced in the former Soviet Union. They consisted of a partly paid maternity
leave (at first one year, later three years) as well as a housing policy that supported
families with three and more children (Zakharov/Ivanova 1996:48). These pronatalist
measures led to early childbearing and a shortening of birth intervals. Therefore,
according to this argument it is assumed that the low fertility in Russia during the
1990s can be traced back, at least partially, to the increase and anticipation of fertility
in the 1980s.
From literature (Kharkova & Andreev 2000; Kohler & Kohler 1999;
Vishnevsky 1996; Zakharov 1999; Zakharov & Ivanova 1996) it seems that all of
these arguments have some empirical basis. Therefore, we do not try to test each of
these hypotheses in this paper, but aim more modestly at specifying in some detail the
determinants of specific parities in current Russia. We analyze (i) the determinants of
births in the 1990s and the changes in their effects since the 1980s and (ii) factors
influencing fertility intentions in the 1990s. Based on the Russian Longitudinal
Monitoring Survey (RLMS) we analyze in detail the probability of giving a first,
                                                
2  For a general overview of arguments (and literature) concerning the explanation of the drop in
fertility in Central and Eastern European Countries since the end of the 1980s see Kohler & Kohler
1999:2f.4
second or third birth for the respondents using logistic regression models. A second
part of our analysis focuses on the intention to have a first, second or third birth. Our
examination concentrates on the approach mentioned above, namely that the changed
socioeconomic framework of fertility decisions might play an important role in the
drop in fertility. This implies that we investigate the effects of purely demographic
factors as well as of economic and psychological variables.
S. Zakharov has suggested to the authors (in private discussions) that
childbearing in Soviet Russia (prior to 1990) was characterized by the following
features
3:
-  The first birth was a very specific event. It depended only on age and was
practically not influenced by any other characteristics.
-  The second birth was a deliberate decision and therefore was determined by
factors internal and external to a family.
-  The third birth was a very rare event about which no specific assumptions can be
made a priori.
The changes in the social welfare system during and after the breakdown of
the Soviet system is well documented (Lokshin 1999; Lokshin et al. 2000; Standing
1996). In Soviet times, social policy was connected to employment. Social
differentiation according to wages was very low. Due to the universal employment of
almost every Soviet citizen (men and women equally), access to childcare services as
well as social benefits (maternal and infant health care, child allowances) were secure.
During the 1990s, the introduction of a market economy with liberalized prices was
accompanied by a breakdown of the social welfare system. There was an
(undocumented) increase in unemployment, extremely low wages (especially for state
employees) mostly below the subsistence minimum, discontinued subsidizing of
prices and a reduction in enterprise-based social benefits. All of this led to increased
inequality and mass impoverishment. The fact that unemployed persons did not
                                                
3 One has to keep in mind that analyses of fertility in the Soviet period exclusively concentrated on
descriptive work. DaVanzo (1996:xiii) points to the fact that “Russian researchers were discouraged
from studying behavioral and social causes of demographic phenomena” which explains the focus on
description and measurement in past Russian demographic research. Therefore, we can rely only on
rather crude information on determinants of births in the past Soviet system.5
automatically receive unemployment benefits (less than 13% of the unemployed
persons in Russia were eligible for it in 1994; Standing 1996:237) shows that the
situation of the Russian population in the 1990s was very insecure.
On this background, some hypotheses can be developed with regard to
possible changes in fertility determinants. In general, we assume that the same
arguments apply to realized births as well as to the intention to give birth.
We make the following hypotheses:
H1: The first birth should be determined only by the age of the respondents.
The social changes described above should imply that fertility decisions are
met with great caution. Since giving birth to a child is irreversible and since the
conditions for raising children are very insecure, having a child is very risky.
Nevertheless there is (still) a strong disapproval of deliberate childlessness in Russia
(Vishnevsky 1996:9). Since social norms normally evolve rather slowly, we do not
expect that the pattern of having at least one birth in a family will change so easily.
Therefore, we assume that the first birth is only a matter of time in the population
under consideration. This supposition is supported by the fact that the reduction in
fertility did not affect all parities equally, but concentrated on the second and third
births (see above).
H2:  The second birth should depend on demographic as well as economic and
psychological variables.
Due to the social stratification which has taken place in Russia after the
transition to a market economy in the 1990s, the birth of a second child should have
become – more than ever before – a product of  (subjectively rational) choice.
4
H2 can be differentiated as follows:
                                                
4 Admittedly, it has to be kept in mind that the use of contraceptives in Russia is somehow restricted
because they are expensive. There is also limited accessibility to contraceptives (Popov 1996:95).6
H2a:  Married persons should have a higher probability of (intention of) giving birth
than non-married persons.
This assumption relates to several arguments: On the one hand, we assume
that married persons have better economic resources since both partners may have an
income. Married persons also have a higher probability of having regular sexual
intercourse than single, divorced or widowed persons and therefore should have a
higher propensity to give birth. A third argument for H2a is that a strong norm against
extramarital births prevails in Russia. The number of extramarital births has increased
during the past years (Lokshin, Harris & Popkin 2000:2185), nevertheless this can be
interpreted as a consequence of couples splitting up rather than a deliberate decision
of women towards being single with a child.
H2b: The higher a person’s subjective well-being is, the higher their probability of
(intention of) giving birth should be.
In order to analyze economic determinants of (the intention to give) births, we
concentrate on the subjectively perceived economic situation. The reason for this is
that due to inflation and to the inaccurate information on income because of the
widely spread ‘informal economy’ (Standing 1996: 238), analyses based on wages are
biased.
Nevertheless, we assume that persons with more resources should be better able to
afford the expenses of an additional (second) child than persons who perceive
themselves as poor.
H2c: The more insecure the (economic) future is, the lower the probability of
(intention of) giving birth should be.
                                                                                                                                           
Nevertheless, Russia is still characterized by a “stable abortion culture” (Popov 1996:84, see also
Stloukal 1999), which means that people can control the risk of giving birth.7
This hypothesis is based on the assumption that individuals are risk-averse, i.e.
the more risky they perceive the consequences of certain actions, the more they will
try to choose other actions with lower risks.
5
H2d: The higher the psychological well-being of individuals, the higher the
probability of (intention of) giving birth .
This hypothesis relates to a current general satisfaction that includes all
aspects of life and does not refer only to economic or social aspects. We assume that
the greater this satisfaction, the better the conditions for coping with additional
burdens on the one hand, but also the better the conditions in order to experience
additional joy from children.
The last two hypotheses deal with aspects of opportunity costs. These include
effects of participation in the labor force as well as features of human capital.
H2e: The higher one’s education, the lower the probability of (intention of) giving
birth.
H2f: Employed women
6 should have a lower probability of (intention of) giving
birth than non-employed women.
Both hypotheses should be particularly important for Russian women, who
experienced massive changes on the labor market during the past years. Even if there
is a low official unemployment level in Russia (Standing 1996:235), the results of
giving up employment are – even in the case of very low incomes – disastrous for
families. There is only one situation in which withdrawal from the labor market does
                                                
5 This assumption is not self-evident: There could also be the possibility that individuals try to reduce
their uncertainty by having children (Friedman, Hechter & Kanazawa  1994). This relates especially to
the uncertainty within the partnership. In the Russian case, uncertainty concerning economic aspects in
life should prevail and therefore we assume that a tendency towards avoiding risks dominates.
6 Our empirical analysis is based exclusively on the female sample of the RLMS. This has two reasons:
(i) The used data set covers information on childbearing only for women and (ii) it can be assumed that
for women fertility decisions have more visible and more important consequences than for men.8
not lead to (further) impoverishment of the family: this is the case if the employer
does not pay salaries on a regular basis and therefore no loss of income results.
7
As we stated above, determinants of (the intention of) giving birth to a third
child were not clear in the former Soviet Union. Therefore, we can only suppose that
this should be a very rare event, and due to the deterioration of social and economic
conditions it should occur even less often than in Soviet times. We assume that the
above mentioned effects of determinants of second birth also play a role with regard
to third birth. In fact, the (perceived) economic situation should be even more
important for decisions and attitudes on third-order childbearing.
2. Data
Our empirical analyses are based on the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring
Survey (RLMS) conducted by the Russian State Statistical Bureau, the Russian
National Scientific Research Center of Preventive Medicine, the University of North
Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA, and the Institute of Sociology, Russian Academy of
Science. It was funded by the World Bank, the Agency for International
Development, the National Science Foundation, and the National Institutes of Health.
The RLMS is a household-based survey aimed at measuring the effects of Russian
reforms on the economic well-being of households and individuals. It contains eight
rounds, each taken in a separate year.
Our first intention was to analyze fertility dynamics over the years 1992 –
1998. To this end we chose data from rounds 2, 5, 7, and 8, corresponding
approximately to the years 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1998. It turned out that the separate
samples were very small and that there was no remarkable difference in age-specific
fertility schedules. Therefore, we combined the data from rounds 5, 6, 7 and 8 into
one sample. We have excluded the data of round 2 from consideration since the
                                                
7 In further empirical analyses (not displayed here), effects of the duration of unpaid work were
included. Due to a high number of missing cases for this variable, the number of cases in the overall
analyses dropped radically and the results turned out to be biased. Therefore, we excluded this variable
from our analyses and we do not even take it into consideration in formulating the hypotheses.9
questionnaire in this round differs from the questionnaires of rounds 5 – 8. For the
same reasons we also did not take into consideration rounds 1, 3 and 4.
The combined sample corresponds to the years 1994 to 1998 (see Table 2.1) and
contains information about 8415 female respondents aged between 15 and 40 years.
  Table 2.1: Interview periods and number of respondents
Number of respondents Round Started Finished
In the first year In the second year
5 11.1994 01.1995 2133 95
6 10.1995 12.1995 2091 0
7 10.1996 12.1996 2050 0
8 10.1998 01.1999 2039 7
Total number of respondents 8415
To confirm that the obtained sample really represents childbearing in Russia,
we compared fertility in age groups as presented in the annual Russian report on
population statistics (see Figure 2.1).
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Figure 2.1: The contribution of the various age groups to total fertility (%):
 - calculated from our sample. Data from the seventh annual10
The dependent variables in our analyses are “birth in the last 12 months” and
“intention to give birth”. The first variable is coded 0 or 1 according to the
respondent’s answer to the question: Have you given birth in the last 12 months? The
second variable is based on the respondent’s answer to the question: Do you want to
have (another) baby? The analyses are restricted to female respondents. Descriptive
statistics for these variables are given in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.
Table 2.2: Number of respondents who had given birth in the last 12 months
Birth in last 12 months Number of respondents Percent
No 2677 91.09 First birth Yes 262 8.91
No 2297 95.11 Second
birth Yes 118 4.89
No 2005 98.82 Third birth Yes 24 1.18
Table 2.3: The number of respondents who intended to have another child
Intention to give birth Number of respondents Percent
No 1062 42.13 First birth Yes 1459 57.87
No 1217 55.52 Second
birth Yes 975 44.48
No 1770 90.72 Third birth Yes 181 9.28
For both dependent variables, we carried out separate logistic regressions (as
described in Section 3 below) for first, second and third births (parities 0, 1, and 2). In
accordance with the hypotheses in Section 1, we consider the influence of the
following factors on the dependent variables.11
1. Ag is the respondent’s age group, given as
Ag=1 for 15 – 20 years,
Ag=2 for 21 – 25 years,
Ag=3 for 26 – 30 years,
Ag=4 for 31 – 35 years,
Ag=5 for 36 – 40 years.
2. Concnd indicates the respondent’s answer to the question How concerned
    are you about the possibility that you might not be able to provide yourself
    with the bare essentials in the next 12 months?
Concnd=1 if a respondent is very concerned,
Concnd=2 : a little concerned,
Concnd=3 : both yes or no,
Concnd=4 : not too concerned,
Concnd=5 : not at all concerned,
Concnd=7 : does not know,
Concnd=8 : refuses to answer.
3.  EcnRk is the respondent’s assessment of the economical status of her
family on a scale with nine levels with 1 corresponding to perceiving the
family as being very poor and 9 corresponding to perceiving the family as
being very rich.
EconRk=97: does not know,
EconRk=98: refuses to answer.
4. Educ  describes the educational level of the respondent:
Educ=1 corresponds to professional courses, schools at factories (PTU,
FZU) but no secondary education,
Educ=2: PTU with secondary education or technical trade school,
Educ=3: technical, medical, music, pedagogical, art school,
Educ=4: institute, university, academy and higher certificates.
5. StLif indicates the respondent’s answer to the question To what extent are
you satisfied with your life in general at the present time?
StLif=1 if a respondent is not at all satisfied,
StLif=2: less than satisfied,
StLif=3: both yes or no,
StLif=4: rather satisfied,
StLif=5: fully satisfied,
StLif=7: does not know,
StLif=8: refuses to answer.12
6. Work relates to the labour force participation of the respondent.
Work=1 if a respondent works,
Work=2 if a respondent is on maternity leave, on leave in order to take
care of a child under 3 years old or if she is on any other paid
or unpaid leave,
Work=3 if a respondent does not work,
Work=7: does not know,
Work=8: refuses to answer.
7. Marsta
8 describes the marital status of the respondent
Marsta=1 if the respondent has never been married,
Marsta=2 if the respondent is married,
Marsta=3 if the respondent is divorced and not remarried,
Marsta=4 if the respondent is a widow(er).
The distributions for all respondents across factor levels are shown in Table
2.4.
It should be noted that due to data limitations, we are not able to test all the
hypotheses for actual fertility behaviour (birth in the last 12 months). The state of a
respondent at the interview may differ from the state before the birth of a child.
Therefore, we consider in this analysis only four independent variables that should be
rather robust to changes: age, education, work, and marital status.
In the case of labour force participation (work), changes might have occurred
as a result of the birth of a child. In this case, we can control for changes: If a
respondent did not work before giving birth to a child, then she will hardly start to
work after that event. On the other hand, if a respondent has worked before giving
birth and stopped work after the event, then she belongs to the category Work=2 (see
above). Thus, we can compare the probabilities of giving birth for employed and
unemployed women.
The marital status of the respondent might also have changed because of the
birth of a child. Since there is no information available on marital history, we can not
(really) control for that. It is obvious that women who are single after giving birth to a
child have also been single before that birth because of the definition of category 1 in
this variable. In all other cases the order of events is not clear. We assume that this
(causality) problem arises especially for first births but to a lesser extent for second
and third births.
                                                
8 For the variable Marsta no categories for non-response were given..13
Table 2.4 Distribution of the independent variables across factor levels
Variable Level Number Percent Cumulative percent
1 1850 21.98 21.98
2 1655 19.67 41.65
3 1520 18.06 59.71
4 1557 18.5 78.22
5 1833 21.78 100
Age
Missing 0 0 0
1 4818 57.25 57.25
2 1769 21.02 78.28
3 660 7.84 86.12
4 636 7.56 93.68
5 294 3.49 97.17
Level of
Concern
Missing 238 2.83 100
1 765 9.09 9.09
2 1143 13.58 22.67
3 1826 21.7 44.37
4 1887 22.42 66.8
5 1835 21.81 88.6
6 456 5.42 94.02
7 161 1.91 95.94
8 33 0.39 96.33
9 8 0.1 96.42
Economic rank
Missing 301 3.58 100
1 996 11.84 11.84
2 1242 14.76 26.6
3 2108 25.05 51.65
4 1282 15.23 66.88
Education
Missing 2787 33.12 100
1 2338 27.78 27.78
2 5006 59.49 87.27
3 658 7.82 95.09
4 92 1.09 96.19
Marital status
Missing 321 3.81 100
1 2148 25.53 25.53
2 2951 35.07 60.59
3 1939 23.04 83.64
4 913 10.85 94.49
5 257 3.05 97.54
Satisfaction with
Life
Missing 207 2.46 100
1 4274 50.79 50.79
2 676 8.03 58.82
3 3305 39.28 98.1
Work
Missing 160 1.9 10014
These problems do not apply for the analysis of the intention to give birth.
Therefore we use all independent variables, including the subjective assessment of the
situation of the respondent.
3. Method
For both analyses we use a logistic regression model, i.e. for a (0,1) random
variable Y ,
k kX odds ∑ + = β β 0 ) ln( ,
where
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factors defined above.
In order to use this model, we created new variables according to the
following rule. Let Z be a variable from the above list of independent variables, and
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For example, for the variable Ag we have five new binary variables Ag1, Ag2,
…, Ag5, where K=1,2,…5, AgK=1 if the respondent’s age belongs to age group K
(Ag=K), otherwise AgK=0.
Note that this procedure replaces missing values by 0. For instance, if the
respondent’s educational level is not defined in the sample, then
Educ1=Educ2=Educ3=Educ4=0. This means that the educational level is unknown.15
We could exclude such cases from our analysis. However, as a result we would obtain
a very small sample for our analysis.
To keep as many cases as possible in our sample, we created one more level
for each variable. Let variable Z take values J= 1, 2, … , L. If the value of Z is
unknown, we define it as L+1. For example, according to this heuristic we now have
five binary variables for the variable Educ: Educ1, Educ2, …, Educ5, where Educ5=1
if the respondent’s educational level is not recorded, otherwise Educ5=0. Therefore,
we created a superfluous variable for each factor except factor Age. Its value is
always known.
We present the results of calculations in an odds ratio form with respect to the
odds corresponding to the first level of each variable (baseline level). If there are no
data for this level, as occurs for Ag1 in the analysis of third birth, then the next level
is chosen as a baseline level, i.e. Ag2 in this example. Besides this, if odds ratios or
coefficients for some levels of a variable are absent in a figure or in a table, it means
that the corresponding sub-sample is not sufficient for the calculation of their effects.
4. Probability of birth
The results of our data processing are given in Tables 4.1 to 4.3 and in Figures
4.1 to 4.3. The tables present the values of the logistic model coefficients, significance
levels, and confidence intervals. The figures present the respective odds ratio.
In H1 we hypothesized that first birth in Russia solely depends on the age of
the respective woman. This assumption can clearly be rejected. The probability of
first births is largest for ages 21 to 25 (significance level 6%) and smallest for ages 36
to 40 (significance level 10%), but other effects are also significant, as we will
describe below.
It appears that already the probability of a first birth also depends on variables
representing human capital. Women with a high education (university level) and
women who are (currently) not working have a higher probability of having
experienced a first birth during the past year than women with a lower education
(significance level 5%) and women who are (still) working (significance level 1%).16
The educational effect might be caused by a postponement of fertility by women with
a higher education. Similar results have appeared for other countries indicating that an
institutional effect is operating (a longer stay in educational institutions leads to later
transition into parenthood, see the discussions for Germany in Blossfeld & Huinink
1989 and Blossfeld, Huinink & Rohwer 1991). Moreover, the effect of female labour
force participation on first birth is a clear result of the ongoing social differentiation
processes in Russia. While in Soviet times nearly 90% of working-age women were
active on the labour market (Lokshin 1999:1) and therefore no specific pattern of
effects of female labour force participation on fertility could arise, the increasing
number of women who were unemployed during our period of observation leads to a
differentiation in fertility decisions. With respect to this effect, the reduction in the
availability and the increased costs of childcare facilities might be critical.
The marital status of the respondents also influences the probability of
occurrences of a first birth as expected. Married women have a higher probability of
giving birth to a first child than any other women. As we argued in Section 1, there
might be several reasons for this relationship including economic, demographic and
normative aspects. Nevertheless, from these data, it is not clear whether the
occurrence of a pregnancy led to marriage or whether the women intended to give
birth only within a marriage. Therefore, we rephrased our conclusion: never married
women have a lower probability of giving birth to a first child.
The same problem also arose for the subjective measures of economic and
psychological well-being. Therefore, they were dropped in the analysis of actual
fertility behaviour.
With regard to second birth, we assumed that its occurrence should depend on
a number of demographic, economic and psychological variables. It turned out, that –
considering the omission of variables on subjective expectations – only labour force
participation has a significant effect on the occurrence of a second birth. Women who
were currently not working had a significantly higher probability of having given17
birth to a second child in the preceding 12 months than women who were working.
These effects seem to be persistent for all parities, even third births.
9
It appears that Russian women who are not gainfully employed invest instead
in giving birth to additional children. On first sight this contradicts the observation
gained from a general description about the economic situation of families in Russia:
One could assume that in order to save themselves from impoverishment women
would somehow try to combine labour force participation with childcare. In any case,
we are not able to control for economic background characteristics in this analysis. It
might be that women who do not participate in the labour market possess enough
economic resources – due to the income of their partners – to leave the labour market
and still provide a financial basis for having children.
Figure 4.1: Odds ratio for the probability of giving birth for different age groups
                                                
9  It should be kept in mind that the number of respondents that have experienced birth of a third child
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Figure 4.2:Odds ratio for the probability of giving birth for different education
levels
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Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag2 0.4265 0.2289 0.0620 -0.0222 0.8752
Ag3 -0.5184 0.3525 0.1410 -1.2094 0.1726
Ag4 -0.7448 0.5540 0.1790 -1.8306 0.3410
Ag5 -1.0475 0.6052 0.0830 -2.2336 0.1386
Educ2 -0.0706 0.3788 0.8520 -0.8129 0.6718
Educ3 0.3306 0.3302 0.3170 -0.3166 0.9779
Educ4 0.7378 0.3727 0.0480 0.0073 1.4683
Educ5 0.2859 0.3141 0.3630 -0.3297 0.9015
MarSta2 3.0763 0.2328 0.0000 2.6201 3.5325
MarSta3 0.9998 0.7212 0.1660 -0.4137 2.4133
Work2 5.2571 0.3634 0.0000 4.5449 5.9693
Work3 2.3771 0.3167 0.0000 1.7563 2.9979
Constant -6.7630 0.4681 0.0000 -7.6805 -5.8455





Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag2 0.5248 0.6438 0.4150 -0.7370 1.7866
Ag3 0.8596 0.6530 0.1880 -0.4202 2.1394
Ag4 0.7744 0.6710 0.2480 -0.5407 2.0895
Ag5 0.4725 0.7523 0.5300 -1.0020 1.9470
Educ2 0.4020 0.3855 0.2970 -0.3537 1.1576
Educ3 -0.0540 0.3753 0.8860 -0.7896 0.6816
Educ4 0.1009 0.4092 0.8050 -0.7010 0.9029
Educ5 0.4285 0.3856 0.2660 -0.3273 1.1842
MarSta2 0.8346 0.5483 0.1280 -0.2401 1.9094
MarSta3 -0.7942 0.7994 0.3210 -2.3611 0.7727
Work2 4.4308 0.4748 0.0000 3.5002 5.3615
Work3 2.8706 0.4846 0.0000 1.9208 3.8204
Constant -7.1068 0.9919 0.0000 -9.0508 -5.1628
                                                
10 From now on, all parameters of superfluous variables (see Section 3) are marked by Italics.20





Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag3 -0.5408 0.6456 0.4020 -1.8061 0.7246
Ag4 -0.3930 0.6309 0.5330 -1.6295 0.8435
Ag5 -0.9576 0.7270 0.1880 -2.3825 0.4674
Educ2 0.1553 0.7830 0.8430 -1.3794 1.6901
Educ3 -0.0127 0.7464 0.9860 -1.4756 1.4502
Educ4 -1.1830 1.1741 0.3140 -3.4842 1.1183
Educ5 0.9097 0.6863 0.1850 -0.4355 2.2549
Work2 4.3650 1.0706 0.0000 2.2666 6.4633
Work3 3.3500 1.0511 0.0010 1.2899 5.4101
Constant -6.7155 1.2787 0.0000 -9.2217 -4.2092
5. Intention to give birth
The results of the analyses of determinants of intentions on giving birth to
(another) child are given in Tables 5.1 to 5.3 and in Figures 5.1 to 5.7. Again, the
tables present the values of the logistic model coefficients, confidence levels, and
confidence intervals; the figures present the respective odds ratios. In contrast to the
results documented in Section 4, the following analyses also take into consideration
(current) subjective expectations of the respondents towards the future.
Again, with respect to a first birth, we get significant effects not only for the
age of the respondent, but also for a number of other determinants. Women between
21 and 30 years have a significantly higher probability (1% level) of intending to give
birth to a first child than younger women, while women in the oldest age cohort (36 to
40 years) have a significantly lower probability (5% level).
Moreover, it turns out that the intention to give first birth is lower the higher
the self-ranking of the respondents on an economic well-being scale. Taking the
respondents who consider themselves as poorest as a reference group, respondents in
the next four categories have a somewhat similar but lower probability of intended21
first birth (not significant). Persons in a middle position on this economic scale show
significantly lower intentions of giving birth to a first child (5% and 10% level).
These effects are much stronger than those on the lower economic levels. Persons
who consider the economic situation of their family as rather good, do not show a
consistent pattern of intentions towards a first birth (not significant).
These results clearly show that there is no simple linear relationship between the
subjective assessment of the economic situation of the family and the probability of
intending a first birth. Instead, we observe a U-curve that is similar to other European
countries, in which especially poor persons and well-situated persons intend to have
(more) children rather than persons in a middle-range economic situation.
By contrast, another subjective measure reveals a straightforward pattern: The
higher the general satisfaction of the respondent with her life, the higher the
probability of intending the birth of a first child. These results are all significant (1%
or 5% level). It appears that satisfaction with general life circumstances leads to an
improved ability to cope with problems connected to childbirth and childrearing, or at
least a more positive view of the respondents on their ability to achieve it.
Just as in the analyses of realized first births, married women show a
significantly higher probability of intending to have a first child than other women
(1% level). This might indicate that in fact, the birth of children in Russia is still
intended to happen in a ‘well-ordered’ context.
Variables relating to human capital and opportunity costs of the respondents
do not play a significant role in the dependent variable. Indeed, there are slightly
reducing effects of education and of being unemployed, but these are not significant.
With respect to expectations of the respondents about their future ability to cope with
economic constraints (Concnd), no clear picture evolves: The effects are very low and
are altogether not significant.
Regarding the intention to have a second child, some similarities with
intention to have a first child arise. Again, the age of the respondent has some impact
on the dependent variable: Women aged from 21 to 25 years show a significantly
higher probability (5% level) and women from 36 to 40 years have a significantly
lower probability (1 % level) of intended birth of a second child. Another similarity is
that again the higher the general satisfaction with life, the higher the probability of22
intending to have a second child (significant on 1% or 5% level). A further parallel is
that marital status does have an impact on the dependent variable. Married women as
well as divorced (and not remarried) women show a significantly higher probability of
wanting a second child than single women (1% level and 10% level). The effect for
divorced women could be interpreted as their intention to enter a new partnership
which might be consolidated by investing in marriage-specific capital, i.e. a further
child that is born in a new steady relationship (Becker, Landes & Michael 1977).
Apart from these similarities, some differences occur. The intention of giving
birth to a second child is again influenced by the subjective economic ranking of the
respondents. However, it turns out that the higher the subjective economic ranking,
the higher the intention to give birth to a second child (significant at 5% level). The
(subjectively experienced) increase in economic resources in fact leads to stronger
intentions to have a second birth. Another distinct feature is that – as in the analyses
on the realization of births – labour force participation of women reduces the intention
of giving birth to a second child: Women who are not working have a higher
probability of an intended second child than women who are working.
The intention of giving birth to a third child also depends on age, general
satisfaction with life and labour force participation. The economic rank of the family
as well as the marital status of women are no longer important. While the latter is
easily understandable (according to literature, most of the births in Russia occur
within wedlock and therefore higher parities should also be born within a marriage),
the former is quite interesting. It seems that parents do not consider their economic
situation when intending a third birth (which should be a strong economic burden).
Anyhow, intentions do not consequently lead to respective fertility behaviour and we
can assume that the realization of that intention depends very much on the actual
economic resources of the family. Unfortunately, we were not able to control for this
in the analysis of the birth of a third child (see Section 4).
Regarding the age of the respondents, a monotonic effect emerges: The higher
the age of a woman, the lower the probability of wanting another (third) child
(significant at 5% and 1%). Again, as in the other analyses on intentions of giving
birth to a further child, we also observe a monotonically increasing significant effect
(10% and 5% level) of general satisfaction with life. Obviously, this relates23
exclusively to the three highest levels of the satisfaction variable. It can be assumed
that psychological well-being has to be on a very high level in order to lead the
respondent to the intention of a third birth. Again, not being in the labour force
strengthens the intention to give birth to a third child. The same effects of this variable
for both dependent variables (intention to give birth to a second and to a third child)
imply that non-working women may have a strategy of investing in their childbearing
career rather than in their working career. Anyhow, we are not able to control whether
this exclusion from the labour market is deliberate or if it is forced due to
unfavourable labour market conditions.
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Figure  5.2: Odds ratio for the probability of intending to give birth for
unemployed respondents
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Figure 5.4:Odds ratio for the probability of intending to give birth for different
levels of satisfaction with life
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Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag2 0.7224 0.1265 0.0000 0.4746 0.9703
Ag3 0.8948 0.2034 0.0000 0.4962 1.2933
Ag4 0.1606 0.2425 0.5080 -0.3147 0.6359
Ag5 -0.5408 0.2666 0.0420 -1.0632 -0.0183
EcnRk2 -0.2893 0.2028 0.1540 -0.6867 0.1081
EcnRk3 -0.2655 0.1860 0.1530 -0.6299 0.0990
EcnRk4 -0.2717 0.1856 0.1430 -0.6355 0.0922
EcnRk5 -0.2490 0.1859 0.1800 -0.6132 0.1153
EcnRk6 -0.5403 0.2462 0.0280 -1.0229 -0.0577
EcnRk7 -0.6015 0.3371 0.0740 -1.2623 0.0592
EcnRk8 -0.9227 0.8200 0.2600 -2.5298 0.6844
EcnRk9 -0.0524 1.2774 0.9670 -2.5561 2.4513
EcnRk10 -0.5515 0.3287 0.0930 -1.1956 0.0927
Educ2 0.0050 0.2171 0.9820 -0.4204 0.4304
Educ3 -0.0552 0.1974 0.7800 -0.4420 0.3316
Educ4 -0.0371 0.2347 0.8740 -0.4972 0.4229
Educ5 -0.3244 0.1771 0.0670 -0.6715 0.0227
StLif2 0.3156 0.1328 0.0170 0.0554 0.5759
StLif3 0.5029 0.1448 0.0010 0.2191 0.7867
StLif4 0.5187 0.1752 0.0030 0.1753 0.8622
StLif5 0.5750 0.2446 0.0190 0.0956 1.0545
StLif6 0.4783 0.5081 0.3460 -0.5175 1.4742
Concnd2 0.1114 0.1170 0.3410 -0.1180 0.3408
Concnd3 -0.0023 0.1569 0.9890 -0.3097 0.3052
Concnd4 0.1898 0.1616 0.2400 -0.1269 0.5065
Concnd5 -0.1524 0.2162 0.4810 -0.5761 0.2713
Concnd6 -0.2954 0.3579 0.4090 -0.9969 0.4060
MarSta2 1.4348 0.1525 0.0000 1.1358 1.7338
MarSta3 0.1031 0.2890 0.7210 -0.4632 0.6695
MarSta4 0.6718 1.1893 0.5720 -1.6591 3.0027
Work2 -0.6855 0.4970 0.1680 -1.6596 0.2886
Work3 -0.1259 0.1263 0.3190 -0.3735 0.1217
Work4 -1.5728 1.0996 0.1530 -3.7280 0.5823
Constant 0.0472 0.2475 0.8490 -0.4378 0.532327





Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag2 0.4874 0.2485 0.0500 0.0005 0.9744
Ag3 0.3647 0.2545 0.1520 -0.1342 0.8636
Ag4 -0.2294 0.2619 0.3810 -0.7428 0.2840
Ag5 -0.9404 0.2749 0.0010 -1.4792 -0.4016
EcnRk2 0.1843 0.2054 0.3690 -0.2183 0.5870
EcnRk3 0.5599 0.1925 0.0040 0.1827 0.9372
EcnRk4 0.4565 0.1990 0.0220 0.0666 0.8465
EcnRk5 0.5034 0.2022 0.0130 0.1071 0.8996
EcnRk6 0.5810 0.2639 0.0280 0.0637 1.0982
EcnRk7 1.0138 0.4113 0.0140 0.2077 1.8200
EcnRk10 -0.5778 0.4955 0.2440 -1.5490 0.3934
Educ2 0.1784 0.1729 0.3020 -0.1604 0.5173
Educ3 0.0677 0.1564 0.6650 -0.2388 0.3742
Educ4 0.0354 0.1716 0.8360 -0.3009 0.3717
Educ5 -0.0976 0.1765 0.5800 -0.4435 0.2482
StLif2 0.3032 0.1232 0.0140 0.0618 0.5447
StLif3 0.2875 0.1421 0.0430 0.0090 0.5659
StLif4 0.4455 0.1859 0.0170 0.0811 0.8099
StLif5 0.7392 0.3351 0.0270 0.0825 1.3959
StLif6 0.7679 0.5766 0.1830 -0.3621 1.8980
Concnd2 -0.0478 0.1220 0.6950 -0.2868 0.1913
Concnd3 0.1654 0.1825 0.3650 -0.1923 0.5231
Concnd4 0.1554 0.1958 0.4270 -0.2284 0.5391
Concnd5 -0.0441 0.2732 0.8720 -0.5796 0.4915
Concnd6 0.1633 0.9786 0.8670 -1.7548 2.0814
MarSta2 0.6087 0.1966 0.0020 0.2234 0.9940
MarSta3 0.3841 0.2244 0.0870 -0.0556 0.8239
MarSta4 0.5112 0.4176 0.2210 -0.3073 1.3297
Work2 0.1070 0.1509 0.4780 -0.1887 0.4027
Work3 0.2375 0.1119 0.0340 0.0182 0.4567
Constant -1.5922 0.3589 0.0000 -2.2956 -0.888928





Level 95% Confidence Interval
Ag3 -0.6808 0.3118 0.0290 -1.2918 -0.0697
Ag4 -0.9761 0.3113 0.0020 -1.5862 -0.3660
Ag5 -1.6477 0.3269 0.0000 -2.2885 -1.0069
EcnRk2 0.0297 0.3891 0.9390 -0.7330 0.7923
EcnRk3 0.1040 0.3568 0.7710 -0.5954 0.8034
EcnRk4 0.2333 0.3563 0.5130 -0.4650 0.9316
EcnRk5 0.3740 0.3594 0.2980 -0.3304 1.0785
EcnRk6 0.5456 0.4497 0.2250 -0.3358 1.4270
EcnRk7 0.3308 0.6055 0.5850 -0.8561 1.5176
EcnRk8 0.9902 0.8680 0.2540 -0.7111 2.6915
EcnRk9 0.5924 1.2912 0.6460 -1.9382 3.1230
EcnRk10 -0.3419 1.0929 0.7540 -2.4839 1.8001
Educ2 0.1308 0.3020 0.6650 -0.4610 0.7227
Educ3 0.2415 0.2744 0.3790 -0.2964 0.7793
Educ4 0.3545 0.3002 0.2380 -0.2338 0.9428
Educ5 0.3105 0.2894 0.2830 -0.2567 0.8778
StLif2 0.2259 0.2288 0.3240 -0.2226 0.6744
StLif3 0.5039 0.2654 0.0580 -0.0163 1.0241
StLif4 0.5905 0.3285 0.0720 -0.0533 1.2343
StLif5 1.1494 0.5070 0.0230 0.1558 2.1430
StLif6 0.6769 1.1348 0.5510 -1.5473 2.9012
Concnd2 0.0417 0.2185 0.8490 -0.3865 0.4699
Concnd3 0.3614 0.3135 0.2490 -0.2530 0.9758
Concnd4 -0.0955 0.3639 0.7930 -0.8087 0.6178
Concnd5 -1.3788 0.7928 0.0820 -2.9327 0.1752
MarSta2 0.1693 0.7800 0.8280 -1.3595 1.6981
MarSta3 0.4536 0.8257 0.5830 -1.1648 2.0720
MarSta4 -0.0319 1.0787 0.9760 -2.1460 2.0822
Work2 -0.1752 0.2917 0.5480 -0.7468 0.3965
Work3 0.5309 0.1841 0.0040 0.1701 0.8918
Constant -2.2523 0.8915 0.0120 -3.9997 -0.505029
6. Conclusions
Our analyses have revealed some similarities and also some differences
between the results for our two dependent variables
11.
In both analyses, first birth (realized and intended) is determined in the same
way by the age of the respondents. Women at the beginning of their 20s have the
highest probability of experiencing and intending a first childbirth, while women in
the oldest age group (36 to 40 years) have the lowest probability. Another common
feature is that being married seems to be important for childbearing as well as for
attitudes concerning it. Things are different with regard to labour force participation:
While the probability of a first birth increases if the respondent is unemployed, the
intention is not dependent on that variable. According to these results, it seems that
the labour force participation of women operates as an intervening restriction in the
realization of intentions of first birth in Russia. Similarly, a high education has an
effect on the realization of first births but not on the respective intention. This result
matches the assumption that there are no basic differences in preferences for the birth
of a first child according to the educational level of the respondents in Russia. The
only differentiation occurs with the realization of these (general) intentions: Higher
educated women move into parenthood later because of their longer stay in
educational institutions than less educated women. Moreover, the intention to have a
first child is reduced if the respondent ranks her family on a medium economic level
and increases with enlarging general satisfaction with life. Since we were not able to
analyze the effects of those variables on the realization of the birth of a first child, one
can only speculate whether economic and psychological well-being of the respondents
is important for the realization of birth intention.
With regard to the assumption in Hypothesis 1 (Section 1) the ‘old’ pattern of
the exclusive dependence of first birth on the age of woman has changed: Economic
aspects have especially gained importance for the transition to motherhood.
Presumably, this is a result of the changed social and economic living conditions in
Russia.
                                                
11 Since different sets of factors were used in the analyses of the two dependent variables, comparisons
are problematic. Therefore, with regard to the following interpretation it should be kept in mind that30
Regarding second birth, clear differences occur between factors that influence
intentions and their realization: While the birth of a child is determined exclusively by
the labour force participation of the mother, the intention is also determined by
demographic, economic and psychological determinants. Therefore, Hypothesis 2 is
confirmed only with respect to birth intentions. The hypotheses concerning second
birth reported in Section 1 have some empirical correspondence for this dependent
variable: Being married, unemployed, better off economically, and being satisfied
with life leads to a higher probability of intending a second birth.
Regarding third birth, a similar observation can be made: While the realization
of third birth depends only on the labour force participation of the mother, a higher
probability of this event is additionally a result of the increasing age of the mother and
of a greater satisfaction with life. In any case, the realization of this intention is an
extremely rare event in our sample (see Table 2.2).
In general, from these analyses we conclude that at least the intention of
giving birth to an (additional) child in Russia at the current time is a result of (more or
less rational) considerations about the consequences of childbirth. We assume that this
can be traced back to the changed social and economic conditions.
It is important to note that 2/3 of the respondents in our sample consider
themselves to be below the middle level on a economic rank scale and only 14% of
the women are satisfied with their life (Table 2.4). Taking into account the above
mentioned effects (especially on childbearing intentions), it is not surprising that
under these conditions fertility in Russia has declined so extremely in the recent past.
                                                                                                                                           
there might be hidden effects of subjective variables that could not be captured in the analysis of
realized births.31
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